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Abstract 
Smith, Wells, Smalarz, and Lampinen (2017) claim that we (Colloff, Wade, & Strange, 2016) 
were wrong to conclude that fair lineups enhanced people’s ability to discriminate between 
innocent and guilty suspects compared to unfair lineups. They argue our results reflect 
differential-filler-siphoning, not diagnostic-feature-detection. But a manipulation that 
decreases identifications of innocent suspects more than guilty suspects (i.e., that increases 
filler-siphoning or conservative responding) does not necessarily increase people’s ability to 
discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects. Unlike diagnostic-feature-detection, filler-
siphoning does not make a prediction about people’s ability to discriminate between innocent 
and guilty suspects. Moreover, we replicated Colloff et al.’s results in the absence of filler-
siphoning (N=2,078). Finally, a model is needed to measure ability to discriminate between 
innocent and guilty suspects. Smith et al.’s model-based analysis contained several errors. 
Correcting those errors shows that our model was not faulty, and Smith et al.’s model 
supports our original conclusions. 
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In Colloff, Wade, and Strange (2016) we set out to test a prediction made by the 
diagnostic-feature-detection theory (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). That theory posits that the 
presence of similar-looking lineup members (i.e., “foils” or “fillers”) in fair lineups allows 
shared facial features which are non-diagnostic of guilt to be noticed and discounted. As a 
result, the theory predicts that witnesses’ ability to discriminate between innocent and guilty 
suspects (i.e., d'Innocent-Guilty) should be—and, as we found, is—better in fair lineups than 
unfair lineups. 
Smith, Wells, Smalarz, and Lampinen (2017) argue instead that (1) fair lineups do not 
improve but instead worsen people’s memory performance and (2) a different theoretical 
account better explains our results. With regard to the first point, Smith et al. argue that we 
reached the wrong conclusion because we fit the wrong signal-detection model to the data. 
With regard to the second point, Smith et al. proposed filler-siphoning theory, which posits 
that the presence of similar-looking foils in fair lineups make it less likely that witnesses will 
pick the suspect. The process is hypothesised to be differential, with similar-looking foils 
attracting more identifications when the suspect in the lineup is innocent than when he is 
guilty. Thus, filler-siphoning predicts that the false alarm rate to innocent suspects will 
decrease more than the hit rate to guilty suspects as lineups become increasingly fair. 
We welcome the opportunity to explain in greater detail why filler-siphoning is not a 
sufficient account of the Colloff et al. (2016) results and how we modelled our data. In what 
follows, we (1) explain how the two theories speak to different aspects of memory 
performance and why diagnostic-feature-detection—but not filler-siphoning—predicts the 
increase in d'Innocent-Guilty that we observed; (2) present new data from an experiment that 
tested the same prediction that was tested in Colloff et al., but this time with no foils involved 
(eliminating the possibility of filler-siphoning) and (3) illustrate that not only was the signal-
detection model we fit to the data appropriate, the model preferred by Smith et al., when fit to 
the data as it should be, confirms that d'Innocent-Guilty was higher in the fair lineup condition, as 
predicted by diagnostic-feature-detection theory. 
 
1. Filler-siphoning does not make a prediction about d'Innocent-Guilty 
Signal-detection theory holds that there are two distinct elements to performance—
discrimination and response bias. A manipulation that influences response bias does not 
necessarily influence discrimination, and vice versa (Green & Swets, 1966). The notion of 
filler-siphoning speaks to how likely people are to choose the suspect as lineups become 
increasingly fair. In that sense, it is analogous to a theory of response bias that speaks to how 
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likely people are to choose the suspect (and foils) as responding becomes increasingly 
conservative. In both cases, responses that would have been made to innocent or guilty 
suspects (i.e., responses that would have ended up in the suspect ID category) end up in a 
different response category. The only difference is that filler-siphoning theory predicts that 
responses will end up in the foil ID category as lineups become increasingly fair, whereas 
responses end up in the “not present” category when responding becomes more conservative 
(e.g., Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 2012). In both cases, the hit rate to guilty suspects and false 
alarm rate to innocent suspects decrease differentially. That is, in both cases, the false alarm 
rate decreases more than the hit rate (e.g., Rotello & Chen, 2016; Rotello, Heit & Dubé, 
2015; Wixted & Mickes, 2018). We agree that our Colloff et al. data are fully consistent with 
differential filler-siphoning theory in this respect. Indeed, we said so (Colloff et al., 2016, 
Supplemental Materials, p.6). 
Critically, however, a manipulation that decreases innocent suspect identifications more 
than it decreases guilty suspect identifications (i.e., a manipulation that increases filler-
siphoning or induces conservative responding) does not necessarily increase people’s ability 
to discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects (e.g., Mickes et al., 2017). Indeed, 
because the notion of filler-siphoning speaks to how likely people are to choose the suspect 
(analogous to a theory of response bias), it makes no a priori prediction about how d'Innocent-
Guilty (the ability to discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects) will change across 
conditions. Increased filler-siphoning is compatible with an increase in d'Innocent-Guilty, a 
decrease in d'Innocent-Guilty, or no change in d'Innocent-Guilty. As such, filler-siphoning theory does 
not make a prediction about the specific change in d'Innocent-Guilty that we observed in Colloff et 
al. Diagnostic-feature-detection theory, however, specifically predicts the d'Innocent-Guilty effect 
that we observed. 
To illustrate this argument, we need a model to understand the mechanism underlying 
filler-siphoning and the prediction made by diagnostic-feature-detection theory. Figure 1 
illustrates a signal-detection interpretation of an unfair lineup, and three possible ways 
d'Innocent-Guilty can change, independently of filler-siphoning, as lineups become fairer. In the 
very unfair lineup in Figure 1A, approximately 20% of foils fall above the decision criterion 
(shaded grey), and only these foils compete for IDs with the much higher proportion of 
innocent and guilty suspects who fall above the criterion. When lineups become fairer, the 
foils in the lineup become more similar to the guilty suspect (i.e., they better match the 
description of the perpetrator), so the distance between the foil distribution and guilty suspect 
distribution becomes smaller. In each plot (i,ii,iii) in Figure 1B, the distance between the foil 
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and guilty suspect distributions has become smaller by the same amount. All that differs is 
the distance between the innocent suspect and guilty suspect distributions (d'Innocent-Guilty), 
which is what diagnostic-feature-detection theory makes a prediction about. In plot (i) of 
Figure 1B, d'Innocent-Guilty remains unchanged as lineups become fairer (contrary to diagnostic-
feature-detection theory); in plot (ii), d'Innocent-Guilty decreases as lineups become fairer (again, 
contrary to diagnostic-feature-detection theory); and in plot (iii), d'Innocent-Guilty increases as 
lineups become fairer (consistent with diagnostic-feature-detection theory). Crucially, 
differential filler-siphoning is observed in all three scenarios involving fairer lineups: In each 
case, approximately 50% of the foils now exceed the decision criterion (shaded grey), and 
those additional foils compete for IDs with the innocent and guilty suspects who exceed the 
criterion. Thus, in fairer lineups, the foil ID rate increases while the innocent and guilty 
suspect ID rates both decrease. Because the foil distribution overtakes a greater proportion of 
the innocent suspect distribution than the guilty suspect distribution, in all three scenarios the 
innocent suspect ID rate decreases more than the guilty suspect ID rate. Hence, differential 
filler-siphoning occurs no matter what the effect of changing to fairer lineups might be on 
d'Innocent-Guilty. Simply put, the d'Innocent-Guilty finding in our Colloff et al. (2016) data is 
compatible with—but not predicted by—the filler-siphoning hypothesis. Conversely, 
diagnostic-feature-detection theory specifically predicts, and is therefore able to explain a 
priori, why d'Innocent-Guilty was larger in the fair lineup conditions. 
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Figure 1. Signal-detection interpretation of (A) an unfair lineup, and (B) three different ways in which d'Innocent-Guilty can 
change, independently of filler-siphoning, when a fairer lineup is used. In panel B, we depict lineups that are less unfair (not 
perfectly fair) compared to panel A to show clearly the predictions made by the filler-siphoning and diagnostic-feature-
detection accounts as lineups become increasingly fair. However, the point illustrated in panel B (namely, that differential-
filler-siphoning is compatible with any outcome with respect to d'Innocent-Guilty) applies to every degree of increased fairness 
relative to panel A, including to perfectly fair lineups (as depicted in Figure 2C). Diagnostic-feature-detection theory predicts 
the outcome illustrated in panel B plot iii (namely, d'Innocent-Guilty should increase when a fairer lineup is used) for reasons 
briefly described in this reply and in more detail in Colloff et al. (2016).  
 
 
2. The predicted effect on d'Innocent-Guilty occurs even in the absence of fillers  
To further test the diagnostic-feature-detection mechanism, and to further underscore 
its independence from filler-siphoning, we conducted a showup experiment (N=2,078), which 
removed the possibility of filler-siphoning because there were no foils. Except for the 
elimination of foils, the “fair” and “unfair” showup conditions were identical to the fair block 
and unfair do-nothing lineup conditions in Colloff et al. (2016). In the “unfair” showup 
condition, the innocent and guilty suspects shared a distinctive feature (e.g., a black eye) that 
was present on the perpetrator at the time of the simulated crime. In the “fair” showup 
condition, neither suspect had the distinctive feature. Differential filler-siphoning theory 
makes no prediction about the outcome of this study, but diagnostic-feature-detection theory 
makes the same prediction as in our original study (i.e., dInnocent-Guilty should be higher in 
“fair” showups). Theoretically, a “fair” showup prevents witnesses from relying on a non-
diagnostic feature by removing it altogether (enhancing the ability of witnesses to 
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discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects) just as, in fair lineups, similar foils who 
share the distinctive feature effectively remove it by causing that feature to be discounted 
(again, enhancing the ability of witnesses to discriminate between innocent and guilty 
suspects). We analysed the showup data in the same way that we analysed the lineup data in 
our original paper and found the same result. ROC analysis showed that people were better 
able to discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects in “fair” showups that prevented 
reliance on the distinctive feature (pAUC=.102, 95% CI=[.091, .112]) than in “unfair” 
showups that allowed people to rely on the non-diagnostic distinctive feature (pAUC=.075, 
95% CI=[.065, .084]), D=3.75, p < .001; see Figure 2A. Fitting a model corroborated these 
findings: dInnocent-Guilty was significantly larger in “fair” (dInnocent-Guilty=1.13) than “unfair” 
showups (dInnocent-Guilty=0.92). Note that these analyses are based on participants who 
identified innocent or guilty suspects in accordance with our pre-registered plans; when full 
ROC curves are plotted and modelled the conclusions remain the same (see Supplemental 
Materials). Critically, these findings cannot be explained by filler-siphoning. 
 
3. An empirical comparison of Smith et al.’s model versus our model 
Smith et al. also argued that the model we used to estimate d'Innocent-Guilty was 
inappropriate because it (1) “misclassified large proportions of false-positive responses as 
rejections” (p.2) and (2) was a “simple-detection model” which did not “have both detection 
and identification components” (p.7). Smith et al. fit a different signal-detection model to the 
data that they argued was more appropriate. Based on the fit of that model, they concluded that 
discriminability is actually higher for unfair lineups (the opposite of the prediction made by 
diagnostic-feature-detection theory). 
To clarify, our model classified—and, thus, analyzed—false-positives to foils as foil 
identifications, not as rejections (see Table S2 Colloff et al., 2016). Also, our model is a 
compound signal-detection model (Duncan, 2006) because it assumes a two-step decision-
making process: first, detect the most familiar lineup member, and second, identify that 
individual if the relevant memory strength variable is strong enough. The only difference 
between our model and Smith et al.’s is the decision rule: ours uses the independent-
observation best-above-criterion rule (hereafter, the BEST model; Clark, Erickson, & 
Breneman, 2011; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) whereas Smith et al.’s uses the integration 
rule (hereafter, the INTEGRATION model; Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010). When we 
empirically compared the two models we found that the BEST model offered a noticeably 
better fit (see Figure 2B). Nonetheless, even Smith et al.’s INTEGRATION model supports our 
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original conclusion: d'Innocent-Guilty is higher in fair lineups compared to unfair lineups according 
to both models (see Figure 2B and Supplemental Materials). 
If the BEST model isn’t faulty, and the INTEGRATION model supports our original 
conclusion, why did Smith et al. conclude that fair lineups impair discriminability? They came 
to this conclusion because, when fitting the model to the unfair lineups, they treated foils and 
innocent suspects as being drawn from the same Gaussian distribution. From a signal-detection 
perspective, doing so makes sense when the lineup is fair (Figure 2C) but not when the lineup 
is unfair (Figure 2D). The ability to discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects is 
represented by d'Innocent-Guilty in both fair and unfair lineups. In fair lineups, d'Innocent-Guilty is equal 
to d'Foil-Guilty (Figure 2C) because the innocent suspect and the foils are equally similar to the 
culprit—in Colloff et al. (2016) the innocent suspect and foils had the same distinctive feature 
as the culprit. But in unfair lineups the innocent suspect looked more like the culprit than did 
the other foils—only the innocent suspect, not the foils, had the same distinctive feature as the 
culprit. Thus, from a signal-detection perspective, unfair lineups require two separate d' 
estimates: d'Innocent-Guilty and d'Foil-Guilty (Figure 2D). Even when analyzing the unfair lineup data, 
Smith et al. combined innocent suspect and foil identifications from target-absent lineups, as if 
they were drawn from the same memory-strength distribution (reducing a 3-distribution model 
to a 2-distribution model). Although creating an “omnibus” summary measure of 
discriminability in unfair lineups seems intuitive, it confounds our measure of interest (d'Innocent-
Guilty) with the experimental manipulation (d'Foil-Guilty; see Supplemental Materials).  
To summarize, we agree filler-siphoning occurs to a greater extent in fair than unfair 
lineups, reducing innocent suspect IDs more than guilty suspect IDs. But the diagnostic-
feature-detection theory makes a qualitatively different a priori prediction that the filler-
siphoning account does not make—d'Innocent-Guilty should increase in fair lineups. Of course, 
the findings reported by Colloff et al. (2016) do not prove diagnostic-feature-detection theory 
is necessarily correct—like any new theory, it needs testing and refining, but the available 
evidence suggests a diagnostic-feature-detection mechanism is a compelling possibility (e.g., 
Flowe, Klatt, & Colloff, 2014). Moreover, in our view, a theory such as the diagnostic-
feature-detection model is more likely to advance our understanding than filler-siphoning 
because it is a well-specified, quantitatively-defined theory which makes specific, testable 
predictions about d'Innocent-Guilty, whereas the filler-siphoning account does not. 
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Figure 2. (A) Partial Receiver Operating Characteristic curves for the fair (block) and unfair (do-nothing) showup 
conditions (p < .001), with lines of best fit drawn using the best-fitting parameters from a signal-detection model; (B) 
Discriminability estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics for the best-fitting versions of the BEST and INTEGRATION 
models to data from the fair (replication) and unfair (do-nothing) conditions of Colloff et al. (2016); and signal-detection 
interpretations of (C) fair lineups, where d'Innocent-Guilty = d'Foil-Guilty, and (D) unfair lineups, where d'Innocent-Guilty ≠ d'Foil-Guilty. 
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